netOctopus 'nantsys.sys' Driver Lets Local Users Gain Kernel Level Privileges
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1019161|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1019161
(Links to External Site)
Date: Jan 7 2008
Execution of arbitrary code via local system, Root access via local system|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
Version(s): 5.1.2 build 1011, possibly other versions|
A vulnerability was reported in netOctopus. A local user can obtain kernel level privileges on the target system.|
A local user can write to the '\\.\NantSys' device and modify the SYSENTER_EIP_MSR register to execute arbitrary code.
The device is loaded by the 'nantsys.sys' driver.
Only the Windows-based agent is affected.
The vendor was notified on September 7, 2007.
Stephen Fewer of Harmony Security reported this vulnerability via iDefense.
A local user can obtain kernel level privileges on the target system.|
The vendor recommends removing the driver from the system. The vendor has issued the following script to remove the driver:|
The Motorola advisory is available at:
Vendor URL: www.netopia.com/software/products/netoctopus/specs.html (Links to External Site)
Access control error|
|Underlying OS: Windows (Any)|
Source Message Contents
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 01.07.08: Motorola netOctopus Agent MSR|
iDefense Security Advisory 01.07.08
Jan 07, 2008
Motorola netOctopus is an asset management agent. It is used to deploy
software, monitor performance, and configure client machines from a
central administrative console. More information can be found on the
vendor's site at the following URL.
Local exploitation of a privilege escalation vulnerability in Motorola
Inc.'s netOctopus could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code in
The netOctopus Agent software is supposed to be installed on all client
machines. It includes a driver, nantsys.sys, that is loaded at system
boot time. This driver exposes a device interface, \\.\NantSys, that is
writable by all users.
This driver includes functionality for reading and writing arbitrary CPU
Model Specific Registers (MSRs). Changing MSR values allows tuning of
various low level CPU operations. By modifying SYSENTER_EIP_MSR, is is
possible to execute arbitrary attacker supplied code in kernel context
by executing a sysenter instruction.
Exploitation of this vulnerability results in the execution of arbitrary
code in kernel context. Unsuccessful attempts may result in a system
crash. However, due to the nature of the vulnerability exploitation is
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version
126.96.36.199 of the nantsys.sys driver as included with netOctopus version
5.1.2 build 1011. Previous versions may also be affected.
Remove write permissions for the Everyone group for the \\.\NantSys
device. This can be accomplished by using a tool like WinObj. This will
prevent regular users from writing to the device.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
To address this vulnerability, Motorola Inc. has made a script available
to remove the affected driver from the system. For more information,
consult their advisory at the following URL.
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2007-5761 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
09/07/2007 Initial vendor notification
09/07/2007 Initial vendor response
01/07/2008 Coordinated public disclosure
This vulnerability was reported to iDefense by Stephen Fewer of Harmony
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