Samba Heap Overflows in Parsing NDR Data Let Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1018050|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1018050
(Links to External Site)
Date: May 14 2007
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
Version(s): 3.0.0 - 3.0.25rc3|
A vulnerability was reported in Samba. A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
Samba does not properly parse NDR data. A remote user can send specially crafted MS-RPC requests to trigger a heap overflow and execute arbitrary code on the target system. The code will run with the privileges of the target service.
The vendor was notified on April 25, 2007. An additional (related) bug was reported on May 5, 2007.
Brian Schafer of TippingPoint Security Response discovered this vulnerability.
A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
The vendor has issued a patch for Samba 3.0.24, available at:|
The Samba advisory is available at:
Vendor URL: www.samba.org/samba/security/CVE-2007-2446.html (Links to External Site)
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: [SAMBA-SECURITY] CVE-2007-2446: Multiple Heap Overflows Allow Remote|
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
== Subject: Multiple Heap Overflows Allow Remote
== Code Execution
== CVE ID#: CVE-2007-2446
== Versions: Samba 3.0.0 - 3.0.25rc3 (inclusive)
== Summary: Various bugs in Samba's NDR parsing
== can allow a user to send specially
== crafted MS-RPC requests that will
== overwrite the heap space with user
== defined data.
Various bugs in Samba's NDR parsing can allow a user
to send specially crafted MS-RPC requests that will
overwrite the heap space with user defined data.
A patch against Samba 3.0.24 has been posted at
There is no immediate workaround for this defect that does
not involve changing the server code in the smbd daemon.
The Samba Team always encourages users to run the latest
stable release as a defense against attacks. If this
is not immediately possible, administrators should read
the "Server Security" documentation found at
This vulnerability was reported to Samba developers by Brian
Schafer, TippingPoint Security Response Lead, as part
of the Zero Day Initiative (http://www.zerodayinitiative.com).
The time line is as follows:
* April 25, 2007: Four individual defects reported to the
email@example.com email alias.
* April 25, 2007: Initial developer response by Samba
developer Volker Lendecke.
* April 28, 2007: Patches for four defects released by
Samba developer Jeremy Allison to ZDI for testing.
* May 3, 2007: Fixed confirmed by original reporter.
* May 5, 2007: Fifth defect reported to firstname.lastname@example.org.
* May 5, 2007: Patches for fifth defects released to ZDI
for testing by Samba developer Jeremy Allison.
* May 10, Announcement to vendor-sec mailing list
* May 14, 2007: Public announcement of the security issue.
== Our Code, Our Bugs, Our Responsibility.
== The Samba Team
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----