GnuPG Interactive Mode Buffer Overflow in make_printable_string() May Let Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1017291|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1017291
(Links to External Site)
Updated: Dec 6 2006|
Original Entry Date: Nov 28 2006
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
Version(s): 1.4.5, 2.0.0|
A vulnerability was reported in GnuPG. A remote user can cause arbitrary code to be executed on the target system.|
A remote user can create a specially crafted message that, when processed by the target user, will trigger a buffer overflow and potentially execute arbitrary code on the target system.
The vulnerability resides in the make_printable_string() function in 'openfile.c'.
The vulnerability can be triggered in interactive mode. Batch mode is not affected.
gpg-agent, gpgsm, gpgv, and other tools from the GnuPG suite are not affected.
The original bug report is available at:
A remote user may be able to cause arbitrary code to be executed on the target system.|
A fix is available via CVS. The vendor has also issued a patch.|
Vendor URL: www.gnupg.org/ (Links to External Site)
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: GnuPG 1.4 and 2.0 buffer overflow|
GnuPG 1.4 and 2.0 buffer overflow
While fixing a bug reported by Hugh Warrington, a buffer overflow has
been identified in all released GnuPG versions. The current versions
1.4.5 and 2.0.0 are affected. A small patch is provided.
Please do not send private mail in response to this message. The
mailing list gnupg-devel is the best place to discuss this problem
(please subscribe first so you don't need moderator approval ).
When running GnuPG interactively, special crafted messages may be used
to crash gpg or gpg2. Running gpg in batch mode, as done by all
software using gpg as a backend (e.g. mailers), is not affected by
Exploiting this overflow seems to be possible.
gpg-agent, gpgsm, gpgv or other tools from the GnuPG suite are not
Apply the following patch to GnuPG. It should apply cleanly to
current versions (1.4.5 as well as 2.0.0) but might also work for
2006-11-27 Werner Koch <firstname.lastname@example.org>
* openfile.c (ask_outfile_name): Fixed buffer overflow occurring
if make_printable_string returns a longer string. Fixes bug 728.
=2D-- g10/openfile.c (revision 4348)
+++ g10/openfile.c (working copy)
@@ -144,8 +144,8 @@
s =3D _("Enter new filename");
=2D n =3D strlen(s) + namelen + 10;
defname =3D name && namelen? make_printable_string( name, namelen, 0):=
+ n =3D strlen(s) + (defname?strlen (defname):0) + 10;
prompt =3D xmalloc(n);
if( defname )
sprintf(prompt, "%s [%s]: ", s, defname );
The code in question has been introduced on July 1, 1999 and is a
pretty obvious bug. make_printable_string is supposed to replace
possible dangerous characters from a prompt and returns a malloced
string. Thus this string may be longer than the orginal one; the
buffer for the prompt has only be allocated at the size of the original
string - oops. Note, that using snprintf would not have helped in
this case. How I wish C-90 had introduced asprintf or at least it
would be available on more platforms.
The original bug report is at https://bugs.g10code.com/gnupg/issue728 .
 See http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-devel .
Werner Koch <email@example.com>
The GnuPG Experts http://g10code.com
Join the Fellowship and protect your Freedom! http://www.fsfe.org
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