TWiki Configuration Script TYPEOF Parameter Lets Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1016603|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1016603
(Links to External Site)
Date: Jul 28 2006
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
Version(s): 4.0.0 - 4.0.4|
A vulnerability was reported in TWiki. A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
The TWiki configure script does not properly validate user-supplied input. If access to the TWiki configure script is not restricted, a remote user can supply an HTTP POST request with a specially crafted TYPEOF parameter to cause the target system to execute arbitrary Perl code. The Perl code, including operating system commands, will run with the privileges of the target web service.
The vulnerability is due to an unsafe eval() function in 'twiki/bin/configure'.
TWiki:Main.BenWheeler reported this vulnerability on July 21, 2006.
A remote user can execute arbitrary Perl code and operating system commands on the target system with the privileges of the target web service.|
The vendor has issued a hotfix for 4.0.4. The vendor has also described a workaround in their advisory, available at:|
Vendor URL: twiki.org/cgi-bin/view/Codev/SecurityAlertCmdExecWithConfigure (Links to External Site)
Input validation error, State error|
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any), UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)|
Source Message Contents
Subject: TWiki Security Alert: Configure Script Allows Arbitrary Shell Command|
This is a security advisory for TWiki installations:
Unauthorized user may execute arbitrary commands in
case the TWiki configure script is not access
TWiki is an enterprise collaboration platform. It is
a Structured Wiki, typically used to run a project
development space, a document management system, a
knowledge base, or any other groupware tool. Users
without programming skills can create web
applications. Developers can extend the functionality
of TWiki with Plugins.
Table of Contents:
* Vulnerable Software Version
* Attack Vectors
* Severity Level
* MITRE Name for this Vulnerability
* Authors and Credits
* Action Plan with Timeline
* External Links
---++ Vulnerable Software Version
* TWikiRelease04x00x04 -- TWiki-4.0.4.zip
* TWikiRelease04x00x03 -- TWiki-4.0.3.zip
* TWikiRelease04x00x02 -- TWiki-4.0.2.zip
* TWikiRelease04x00x01 -- TWiki-4.0.1.zip
* TWikiRelease04x00x00 -- TWiki-4.0.0.zip
---++ Attack Vectors
Supply a specially crafted HTTP POST request on the TWiki
An intruder is able to execute arbitrary shell commands with
the privileges of the web server process, such as user
nobody. Properly configured TWiki sites with authenticated
configure script are not affected.
---++ Severity Level
The TWiki SecurityTeam  triaged this issue as documented
in TWikiSecurityAlertProcess  and assigned the following
* Severity 1 issue: The web server can be compromised
---++ MITRE Name for this Vulnerability
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project has
assigned the name CVE-2006-3819  to this vulnerability.
All TWiki 4.0.x releases have an unsafe eval in
twiki/bin/configure which can be exploited to evaluate
arbitrary Perl code and run arbitrary commands as the httpd
The exploit requires creating a special form to submits a
crafted TYPEOF parameter to the configure script. Example:
<form method="post" action="/twiki/bin/configure" />
<input type="hidden" name="action" value="update" />
name="TYPEOF:);system('/bin/touch /tmp/whoops');my @a=("
<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit" />
This results in the following code being evaluated:
$def = defined( $TWiki::cfg);
system('/usr/bin/touch /tmp/whoops');my @a=( );
As expected, the file /tmp/whoops appears on the server. The
last bit simply avoids a syntax error.
* Restrict access to the TWiki configure script.
* Apply the hotfix indicated below.
NOTE: The hotfix is known to prevent the current
attacks, but it might not be a complete fix
This section describes how to protect a TWiki installation
on two levels.
* Level 1: Restrict access to the configure script
* Level 2: Hotfix download for TWiki 4.0.4
---+++ Level 1: Restrict access to the configure script
The configure script should be protected from general
access. It is a tool designed for administrators only and
should be restricted to invocation by them only. This is
typically done by using the basic Apache authentication.
The configure script cannot save any settings once the
password has been saved for the first time, but the script
could still be vulnerable to specially crafted field values.
In addition, the script reveals many details about the
webserver that should not be made public.
In order to protect TWiki's configure script you can choose
between two methods:
* Limit access to specific local IP addresses.
* Limit access to a few administrator users.
The access restriction can be done using Apache http.conf
files or .htaccess files.
Protection of configure using Apache config files:
The example below shows the part of an example Apache config
file that configures the TWiki =bin= directory.
Allow from all
Deny from env=anonymous_spider
Options ExecCGI FollowSymLinks
# Password file for TWiki users
AuthName 'Enter your WikiName: (First name and last name,
no space, no dots, capitalized, e.g. JohnSmith).'
# File to return on access control error (e.g. wrong
# password). By convention this is the TWikiRegistration
# page, that allows users to register with the TWiki.
# Apache requires this to be a *local* path.
ErrorDocument 401 /twiki/bin/view/TWiki/TWikiRegistration
# Limit access to configure to specific IP addresses and
# or users. Make sure configure is not open to the general
# public. The configure script is designed for
# administrators only. The script itself and the
# information it reveals can be abused by attackers if not
# properly protected against public access. Replace
# JohnDoe with the login name of the administrator.
Deny from all
Allow from 127.0.0.1, 192.168.1.10
Require user JohnDoe
# When using Apache type login the following defines the
# TWiki scripts that makes Apache ask the browser to
# authenticate. It is correct that scripts such as view
# are not authenticated. (un-comment to activate)
# require valid-user
The parts that protect the configure script are:
* The AuthUserFile, AuthName and AuthType defined the
type of authentication and the password file location.
This is required to limit the access to specific users.
* In the FilesMatch section the "Require user JohnDoe"
defined who has access to the configure script.
* In the FilesMatch section the "Allow from 127.0.0.1,
192.168.1.10" limits access to these two IP addresses.
Note that the first is localhost.
* In the FilesMatch section the "Satisfy Any" means that
either the login name or the IP address must be valid.
If you only setup one of the protections you can remove
this. If you want IP address match and login to be
required change this to "Satisfy All"
Above Apache config example is taken from file
twiki_httpd_conf.txt, located in the root of your TWiki
installation after upgrading it to TWiki-4.0.4 Hotfix 2 .
The accumulated Hotfix 2 for TWiki-4.0.4  can be
If you configure Apache via .htaccess files:
If you configure your Apache via .htaccess files the
protection method is identical to the method with config
files, with these exceptions:
* A .htaccess file is put in the bin directory
* The same <FilesMatch "^configure.*"> section is placed
in the .htaccess file
* The <Directory> </Directory> section is not needed.
An example .htaccess.txt file is located in the bin of your
TWiki installation after upgrading it to TWiki-4.0.4 Hotfix
2 . The accumulated Hotfix 2 for TWiki-4.0.4  can be
Apache Config Generator:
You can quickly create a complete Apache config file,
tailored to your installation, at
TWiki:TWiki.ApacheConfigGenerator . It protects also the
configure script, based on your preference.
---+++ Level 2: Hotfix download for TWiki 4.0.4
An accumulated Hotfix 2 for TWiki-4.0.4 is available for
download. It contains an improved version of the configure
script, fixing the known vulnerability. It is available at
---++ Authors and Credits
* Credit to TWiki:Main.BenWheeler for disclosing the
issue to the twiki-security mailing list
* TWiki:Main.CrawfordCurrie for creating a fix
* TWiki:Main.KennethLavrsen for creating a hotfix for
TWiki release 4.0.4
* TWiki:Main.PeterThoeny and TWiki:Main.KennethLavrsen
for creating the advisory
---++ Action Plan with Timeline
* 2006-07-21: User discloses vulnerability to
* 2006-07-22: Developer verifies issue
* 2006-07-23: Developer creates fix
* 2006-07-25: Developer creates hotfix
* 2006-07-25: Security team creates advisory
* 2006-07-26: Send alert to twiki-announce mailing list
and twiki-dev mailing list
* 2006-07-26: Publish advisory on TWiki.org
* 2006-07-28: Issue a public security advisory (pending)
Please provide feedback at the security alert topic ,
---++ External Links
-- Contributors: KennethLavrsen, CrawfordCurrie, PeterThoeny
- 27 Jul 2006
* Peter Thoeny Peter@StructuredWikis.com
* http://StructuredWikis.com - bringing wikis to the workplace
* http://TWiki.org - is your team already TWiki enabled?
* Knowledge cannot be managed, it can be discovered and shared
* This e-mail is: (_) private (_) ask first (x) public
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