Macromedia Flash Index Boundary Error Lets Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1015156|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1015156
(Links to External Site)
Date: Nov 5 2005
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
Version(s): 188.8.131.52 and prior versions|
A vulnerability was reported in Macromedia Flash. A remote user can cause arbitrary code to be executed on the target user's system.|
A remote user can create a specially crafted SWF media file that, when played by the target user, will trigger a memory access error and execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user. The flaw resides in 'Flash.ocx'.
The vendor credits eEye Digital Security and Sec Consult with reporting this vulnerability.
The vendor was notified on June 27, 2005.
A remote user can create content that, when played by the target user, will execute arbitrary code on the target user's system.|
The vendor has issued fixed versions (184.108.40.206, 220.127.116.11, and 18.104.22.168).|
Vendor URL: www.macromedia.com/devnet/security/security_zone/mpsb05-07.html (Links to External Site)
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any), UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: [Full-disclosure] [EEYEB-20050627B] Macromedia Flash Player|
Macromedia Flash Player Improper Memory Access Vulnerability
November 4, 2005
June 27, 2005
Macromedia Flash 6 (on all Windows platforms)
Macromedia Flash 7 (on all Windows platforms)
eEye Digital Security has discovered a vulnerability in Macromedia Flash
Player versions 6 and 7 that will allow an attacker to run arbitrary
code in the context of the logged in user. An array boundary condition
may be violated by a malicious SWF file in order to redirect execution
into attacker-supplied data.
The vulnerable code exists in Flash.ocx, which embodies the code
responsible for playing back SWF files. One function maintains a large,
256-element table of function pointers on the stack, and uses a frame
type identifier read from the SWF file as an index into the array,
without enforcing the array boundaries. The following disassembly
depicts the affected code:
.text:1002714F mov eax, [esi+0CA4h] ; type number
.text:10027155 mov ecx, [esi+94h] ; base of table
.text:1002715B lea eax, [ecx+eax*8] ; get element address
.text:1002715E mov ecx, [eax] ;
Although the index is not validated, its value is elsewhere restricted
to be at most 0x8000, so the attacker can cause a function pointer to be
retrieved from memory up to roughly 64KB after the base of the table on
the stack. Typically this range will include heap memory, so by
planting specific data on the heap, the attacker can very easily control
the exact value of the function pointer. Reliable exploitation using
this technique within Internet Explorer has been demonstrated by eEye
Retina Network Security Scanner has been updated to identify this
Blink - Endpoint Vulnerability Prevention - protects from this
Macromedia has addressed this issue in the following security bulletin;
This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CAN-2005-2628
and OSVDB ID 18825.
Thanks Derek and and eEye guys help me wrote this advisory. Greeting
xfocus guys and venustech lab guys.
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