Motorola Timbuktu PlughNTCommand Named Pipe Stack Overflow Lets Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1022455|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1022455
(Links to External Site)
Date: Jun 25 2009
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes |
A vulnerability was reported in Motorola Timbuktu. A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
A remote user can send specially crafted data via the PlughNTCommand named pipe to trigger a stack overflow and execute arbitrary code on the target system. The code will run with SYSTEM privileges.
The vendor was notified on July 9, 2008.
Ruben Santamarta of reversemode.com reported this vulnerability.
A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system with SYSTEM privileges.|
The vendor has issued a fix, available at:|
Vendor URL: www.netopia.com/software/products/tb2/ (Links to External Site)
|Underlying OS: Windows (Any)|
Source Message Contents
Subject: iDefense Security Advisory 06.25.09: Motorola Timbuktu Pro PlughNTCommand|
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iDefense Security Advisory 06.25.09
Jun 25, 2009
Motorola Inc.'s Timbuktu Pro is a remote control software that allows
remote access to a computer's desktop. It is available for Mac OS X and
Windows systems and provides integration with Skype and SSH. More
information is available on Motorola's web site at the following URL.
Remote exploitation of a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in
Motorola Inc.'s Timbuktu Pro could allow attackers to execute arbitrary
code with SYSTEM privileges.
Timbuktu fails to properly handle user-supplied data passed through a
named pipe session. When the PlughNTCommand named pipe receives an
overly large character string, a buffer overflow will occur resulting
in arbitrary code execution.
Exploitation of this issue allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code
with SYSTEM privileges. An attacker would need to locate a system
running the Timbuktu Pro software. Upon finding a system that is
running the vulnerable software, the attacker would check for the
availability of the PlughNTCommand named pipe. If the named pipe is
available, the attacker can connect and create a session without
authenticating. The attacker can then send malformed data to the
Timbuktu Pro process, resulting in arbitrary code execution with
iDefense has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in Timbuktu
Pro version 8.6.5. Previous versions may also be affected.
A named pipe filter can be applied to the registry. Named pipe filtering
can be done in two ways dynamic filtering and white listing. Microsoft
provides further details about how to implement this workaround.
Named Pipe Filter workaround: http://support.microsoft.com/kb/925890
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
Motorola Inc. has released a patch which addresses this issue. For more
information, consult their advisory at the following URLs:
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
name CVE-2009-1394 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in
the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org/), which standardizes names for
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
07/09/2008 - Initial Contact
07/14/2008 - Initial vendor response
09/15/2008 - Vendor update received
03/12/2009 - Vendor status requested
03/12/2009 - Vendor update received
04/24/2009 - Vendor status requested
04/24/2009 - Tentative disclosure set to May 13
06/25/2009 - Coordinated Public Disclosure
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