Progress Database Heap Overflow Lets Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1018389|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1018389
(Links to External Site)
Date: Jul 13 2007
Execution of arbitrary code via network, User access via network|
A vulnerability was reported in Progress Database. A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
A remote user can send specially crafted data to port 5520 or 5530 on the target system to trigger a heap overflow and execute arbitrary code on the target system. The code will run with the privileges of the target service.
The vendor was notified on March 14, 2007.
Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint DVLabs, discovered this vulnerability.
The original advisory is available at:
A remote user can execute arbitrary code on the target system.|
No solution was available at the time of this entry.|
Vendor URL: www.progress.com/ (Links to External Site)
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: [Full-disclosure] TPTI-07-12: Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap|
TPTI-07-12: Multiple Vendor Progress Server Heap Overflow Vulnerability
July 12, 2007
-- CVE ID:
-- Affected Vendor:
-- Affected Products:
RSA Authentication Manager
-- TippingPoint(TM) IPS Customer Protection:
TippingPoint IPS customers have been protected against this
vulnerability since May 22, 2007 by Digital Vaccine protection
filter ID 5326. For further product information on the TippingPoint IPS:
-- Vulnerability Details:
This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code on
vulnerable installations of RSA Authentication Manager and other
products that include the Progress server. User interaction is not
required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists in the Progress Server listening by default on
TCP ports 5520 and 5530. The _mprosrv.exe process trusts a user-supplied
DWORD size and attempts to receive that amount of data into a statically
allocated heap buffer.
The user-supplied size parameter is used directly as an argument to
recv() as shown below:
0044F24F mov eax, [esp+42Ch+buf] ; 1012 byte heap buffer
0044F253 push 0 ; flags
0044F255 push esi ; attacker-controlled size
0044F256 push eax ; 1012 byte heap buffer
0044F257 push edi ; s
0044F258 call recv
The heap buffer which is received into is 1012 bytes. Sending more than
1012 bytes will overflow into subsequent heap chunks. This heap
corruption can be leveraged by an attacker to execute arbitrary code in
the context of the SYSTEM user.
-- Vendor Response:
RSA has made hot fixes available to registered users through RSA
Customer Support. For more information, please visit the RSA website
for the appropriate product:
For RSA ACE/Server 5.2, apply the following hot fix on top of Patch 1:
For RSA Authentication Manager 6.0, apply the following hot fix on top
of the Patch 2 - (scroll down to the second half of the page)
For RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0, apply the following hot fix on top of
the Upgrade 2.0.1:
For RSA Authentication Manager 6.1, apply the 6.1.2 patch:
RSA recommends that all customers using RSA ACE/Server 5.2, RSA
Authentication Manager 6.0 and 6.1, and RSA SecurID Appliance 2.0
install the hot fixes. RSA states "Notification was recently (June 28,
2007) sent to RSA SecurCare customers about the vulnerability and the
correct way to resolve it.
-- Disclosure Timeline:
2007.03.14 - Vulnerability reported to vendor
2007.05.22 - Digital Vaccine released to TippingPoint customers
2007.07.12 - Coordinated public release of advisory
This vulnerability was discovered by Aaron Portnoy, TippingPoint DVLabs.
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