L-Soft LISTSERV Input Validation Flaw in WA.EXE Management Interface May Permit Cross-Site Scripting Attacks Against List Administrators
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1008551|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1008551
(Links to External Site)
Date: Dec 27 2003
Disclosure of authentication information, Disclosure of user information, Execution of arbitrary code via network, Modification of user information|
Exploit Included: Yes |
An input validation vulnerability was reported in L-Soft's LISTSERV mailing list software. A remote user can conduct cross-site scripting attacks against administrators.|
http-equiv reported that the WA.EXE management interface does not properly filter HTML code from user-supplied input in some of the script parameters before displaying information based on the user-supplied input.
A remote user can create a specially crafted URL that, when loaded by a target user, will cause arbitrary scripting code to be executed by the target user's browser. The code will originate from the site running the LISTSERV software and will run in the security context of that site. As a result, the code will be able to access the target user's cookies (including authentication cookies), if any, associated with the site, access data recently submitted by the target user via web form to the site, or take actions on the site acting as the target user.
A demonstration exploit URL is provided:
[Editor's note: The demonstration URL worked as of the time of the original posting on a site operated by L-Soft, but appears to have been corrected since then.]
A remote user can access the target user's cookies (including authentication cookies), if any, associated with the site running the LISTSERV software, access data recently submitted by the target user via web form to the site, or take actions on the site acting as the target user.|
No solution was available at the time of this entry.|
[Editor's note: It appears that LISTSERV software that is hosted by L-Soft may have been corrected, but that has not been confirmed yet.]
Vendor URL: www.lsoft.com/ (Links to External Site)
Input validation error|
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any), OpenVMS, UNIX (AIX), UNIX (BSD/OS), UNIX (FreeBSD), UNIX (HP/UX), UNIX (SGI/IRIX), UNIX (Solaris - SunOS), UNIX (Tru64), Windows (NT), Windows (2000), Windows (XP)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: [Full-Disclosure] DANGER ZONE: Internet Explorer|
Friday, December 26, 2003
Technical 'silent delivery and installation of an executable on a
target computer. No client input other than viewing and web site'.
This may be achieved with the Internet Explorer series of so-
called "browsers", all security settings set to HIGH !
[***premium advertising space: your ad here for a nominal monthly
fee contact email@example.com***]
Not so simple:
The current trend is to dismiss, pooh pooh, the never-ending ongoing
[almost daily] discoveries of vulnerabilities in the Internet
Explorer series of browsers. So much so there remains in the account
a balance of several full and complete remote compromises [courtesy
of: Liu Die Yu
icrosoft_ie/index.html] summarily dismissed as "well the internet is
a big bad place, don't surf to unknown sites, and sites you do know
and trust, place in the Trusted Zone. You'll be fine. 'Trust Us !"".
The so-called "Trusted Site" zone setting in the Internet Explorer
series of browsers, is set to LOW on default [screenshot:
http://www.malware.com/trustus.png 28KB]. What that means
is 'minimal safeguards and prompts are provided...most content is
downloaded and run without prompts'. So who do [can] we trust?
For example, we input into the so-called Trusted Zone, the
manufacturer commonly known as Microsoft Dot Com [screenshot:
http://www.malware.com/havefaith.png 15KB]. In fact this peculiar
method and remedy of participating in the World Wide Web is
recommended by the brains behind the the manufacturer commonly known
as Microsoft Dot Com.
There is a small yet critical bug in the mailing list software
called LISTSERV from http://www.lsoft.com/. A trivial yet important
ability to effect the common so-called 'cross site scripting' [see:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html] 'malicious html tag
embedding in client web requests':
Microsoft.com uses the mailing list software called LISTSERV. So do
some 300,000 combined public and local others [Note: These numbers
do not include Intranet servers]. Banks. Governments. Schools etc
So what that means is if we 'trust' our government, or trust our
bank or our school or even our software 'manufacturer', we are
advised to place everyone else in the 'restricted zone' and our
trusted sites in the 'trusted zone' where: 'minimal safeguards and
prompts are provided...most content is downloaded and run without
What that means is we can install via
<object classid="" codebase=""> any executable file from within the
same domain as we see fit. The same domain in the so-called 'Trusted
Site' zone that is. Be it *.gov. *.microsoft.com, *.edu et cetera.
Technically our codebase cannot point to a remote site outside the
zone as it will be cached in the Temporary Internet File [TIF] and
will prompt for install as that remote site is in the Internet Zone.
However, theoretically we can play havoc within our *.gov and .edu
domains on one another. More importantly, we might very well be
able to write our entire Self-Executing HTML file into all of these
Content-Location:fi le:///m alware.exe
<o bjec t CLAS SID="CLSID:5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 - 5 5 5 5"
In which case the entire package will cached in the TIF under the
disguise of a so-called 'TRUSTED ZONE' !
Don't trust us. Trust them.
[***less than premium advertising space: your ad here for a nominal
monthly fee contact firstname.lastname@example.org***]
Happy New Year and be safe out there. It's not what it all seems.
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Go to the Top of This SecurityTracker Archive Page