Linux Cross-Referencing (LXR) Project Discloses Files on the System to Remote Users
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1006264|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1006264
(Links to External Site)
Updated: Apr 30 2004|
Original Entry Date: Mar 11 2003
Disclosure of system information, Disclosure of user information|
Exploit Included: Yes |
Version(s): 0.9.2 and prior versions|
An input validation vulnerability was reported in the Linux Cross-Referencing (LXR) project software. A remote user can view files located anywhere on the system.|
It is reported that the software does not properly filter user-supplied input in the 'v' variable. A remote user can reportedly supply a specially crafted URL containing '../' directory traversal characters to view arbitrary files on the system with the privileges of the target web server. A demonstration exploit URL is provided:
A remote user can view files located anywhere on the system that are readable by the web server process.|
No solution was available at the time of this entry.|
Vendor URL: sourceforge.net/projects/lxr (Links to External Site)
Input validation error|
|Underlying OS: Linux (Any)|
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Subject: Cross-Referencing Linux vulnerability|
+ Type: To gain visibility
+ Software: Cross-Referencing Linux.
+ Verions: until 0.9.2
+ Exploit: Si.
+ Autor: Albert Puigsech Galicia
+ Contact: firstname.lastname@example.org
Cross-Referencing Linux, as known as LXR, allow read all linux kernel
source using a web navigator. The aplication is writen using Perl languaje,
and convert to HTML all linux kernel sources. For more information visit the
project's oficial website on http://lxr.linux.nu.
LXR suports to navigate through various kernel version. The version is
readed from 'v' variable, witch content are placed in the path used to open
the file without filter the '..' special directory.
In posible to read any file on systema as apache privileges getting up
on tree directory sending malicious data to 'v' variable. Is necessary too, to
finish the path with nul char to ignore the rest of the path, so we add %00 at
the end of 'v'.
An example of exploit call may be:
There aren't an oficial patch for a moment, but is too easy to put a
regex filtering the '..' content when 'v' variable is read.
> Albert Puigsech Galicia