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Category:   Application (Generic)  >   Windows UPnP (Ssdpsrv, others) Vendors:   Microsoft
(Microsoft Issues New Fix) Microsoft Windows Me Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) Ssdpsrv.exe Server Component Can Be Crashed by Remote Users
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1003030
SecurityTracker URL:  http://securitytracker.com/id/1003030
CVE Reference:   CVE-2001-0721   (Links to External Site)
Date:  Dec 20 2001
Impact:   Denial of service via network
Fix Available:  Yes  Vendor Confirmed:  Yes  

Description:   A vulnerability was reported in Ssdpsrv, a component of the Microsoft Windows Me Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) implementation. A remote user may be able to cause the Ssdpsrv service to crash.

It is reported that a remote user can connect to the Ssdpsrv port and cause the service to crash. The service must be manually restarted or the server must be rebooted in order for the service to return to normal operation.

The following steps can reportedly be used to cause the service to crash:

Connect to the computer on port 5000.
Send 3 to 5 newline characters.
You then get an error and are disconnected.

A demonstration exploit transcript is provided:

<snip>
bash-2.05$ telnet 165.121.234.217 5000
Trying 165.121.234.217...
Connected to 165.121.234.217.
Escape character is '^]'.



HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request

Connection closed by foreign host.
bash-2.05$
</snap>

The error caused by the crash is provided:

Ssdpsrv has caused an error in MSVCRT.DLL.
Ssdpsrv will now close.
If you continue to experience problems,
try restarting your computer.

Several users have reported that they are unable to reproduce the error.

Impact:   A remote user can cause the Ssdpsrv.exe service to crash.
Solution:   The vendor has released a revised fix that also corrects a separately reported vulnerability.

Microsoft Windows 98/98SE:

http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=34991

Microsoft Windows ME:

http://download.microsoft.com/download/winme/Update/22940/WinMe/EN-US/314757USAM.EXE

Microsoft Windows XP:
http://www.microsoft.com/Downloads/Release.asp?ReleaseID=34951

The vendor reports that the patch for Windows 98 and 98SE can be installed on any Windows 98 or 98SE system on which the Windows XP Internet Connection Sharing client has been installed. The patch for Windows ME can be installed on systems running Windows ME Gold. The patch for Windows XP can be installed on systems running Windows XP Gold.

The vendor plans to include the fix for this issue in Windows XP Service Pack 1.

This patch supercedes patch MS01-054.

See the Source Message for the vendor's advisory containing directions on how to verify the patch installation.

Vendor URL:  www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-059.asp (Links to External Site)
Cause:   Exception handling error
Underlying OS:  Windows (Me), Windows (98), Windows (XP)
Underlying OS Comments:  Windows 98 and 98SE are only affected if the Internet Connection Sharing that ships with Windows XP has been installed on the host

Message History:   This archive entry is a follow-up to the message listed below.
Oct 20 2001 Microsoft Windows Me Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) Ssdpsrv.exe Server Component Can Be Crashed by Remote Users



 Source Message Contents

Subject:  Microsoft Security Notification Bulletin MS01-059


-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Title:      Unchecked Buffer in Universal Plug and Play can Lead
            to System Compromise
Date:       20 December 2001
Software:   Windows 98, Windows 98SE, Windows ME, Windows XP
Impact:     Run code of attacker's choice
Max Risk:   Critical
Bulletin:   MS01-059

Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at: 
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-059.asp.
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------

Issue:
======
The Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) service allows computers to
discover and use network-based devices. Windows ME and XP 
include native UPnP services; Windows 98 and 98SE do not include a
native UPnP service, but one can be installed via the 
Internet Connection Sharing client that ships with Windows XP. This
bulletin discusses two vulnerabilities affecting these 
UPnP implementations. Although the vulnerabilities are unrelated,
both involve how UPnP-capable computers handle the 
discovery of new devices on the network. 

The first vulnerability is a buffer overrun vulnerability. There is
an unchecked buffer in one of the components that handle 
NOTIFY directives - messages that advertise the availability of
UPnP-capable devices on the network. By sending a specially 
malformed NOTIFY directive, it would be possible for an attacker to
cause code to run in the context of the UPnP service, 
which runs with System privileges on Windows XP. (On Windows 98 and
Windows ME, all code executes as part of the operating 
system). This would enable the attacker to gain complete control over
the system. 

The second vulnerability results because the UPnP doesn't
sufficiently limit the steps to which the UPnP service will go to 
obtain information on using a newly discovered device. Within the
NOTIFY directive that a new UPnP device sends is 
information telling interested computers where to obtain its device
description, which lists the services the device offers 
and instructions for using them. By design, the device description
may reside on a third-party server rather than on the 
device itself. However, the UPnP implementations don't adequately
regulate how it performs this operation, and this gives 
rise to two different denial of service scenarios. 

In the first scenario, the attacker could send a NOTIFY directive to
a UPnP-capable computer, specifying that the device 
description should be downloaded from a particular port on a
particular server. If the server was configured to simply echo 
the download requests back to the UPnP service (e.g., by having the
echo service running on the port that the computer was 
directed to), the computer could be made to enter an endless download
cycle that could consume some or all of the system's 
availability. An attacker could craft and send this directive to a
victim's machine directly, by using the machine's IP 
address. Or, he could send this same directive to a broadcast and
multicast domain and attack all affected machines within 
earshot, consuming some or all of those systems' availability. 

In the second scenario, an attacker could specify a third-party
server as the host for the device description in the NOTIFY 
directive. If enough machines responded to the directive, it could
have the effect of flooding the third-party server with 
bogus requests, in a distributed denial of service attack. As with
the first scenario, an attacker could either send the 
directives to the victim directly, or to a broadcast or multicast
domain.

Mitigating Factors:
====================
General: 
 - Standard firewalling practices (specifically, blocking ports
   1900 and 5000) could be used to protect corporate networks
   from Internet-based attacks. 

Windows 98 and 98SE: 
 - There is no native UPnP support for these systems. Windows 98
   and 98SE systems would only be affected if the Internet Connection
   Sharing Client from Windows XP had been installed on the system. 
 - Windows 98 and 98SE machines that have installed the Internet 
   Connection Sharing client from a Windows XP system that has 
   already applied this patch are not vulnerable. 

Windows ME: 
 - Windows ME provides native UPnP support, but it is neither 
   installed nor running by default. (However, some OEMs do 
   configure pre-built systems with the service installed and
   running). 

Windows XP: 
 - Internet Connection Firewall, which runs by default, would make it
   significantly more difficult for an attacker to determine the IP
   address of an affected machine. This could impede an attacker's
   ability to attack a machine via unicast messages. However, attacks
   via multicast or broadcast would still be possible.

Risk Rating:
============
Buffer Overrun:
 - Internet servers: None
 - Intranet servers: None
 - Client systems: Critical for Windows XP, moderate for Windows 98, 
   Windows 98SE and Windows ME

Denial of service:
 - Internet servers: None
 - Intranet servers: None
 - Client systems: Moderate

Aggregate risk:
 - Internet servers: None
 - Intranet servers: None
 - Client systems: Critical for Windows XP, moderate for Windows 98, 
   Windows 98SE and Windows ME

Patch Availability:
===================
 - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the 
   Security Bulletin at
   http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-059.asp
   for information on obtaining this patch.

Acknowledgment:
===============
 - eEye Digital Security (http://www.eeye.com)

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS 
PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. MICROSOFT DISCLAIMS
ALL WARRANTIES, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING THE 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
IN NO EVENT SHALL MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS 
BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, LOSS OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR 
SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. SOME 
STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR
CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING 
LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY.

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*******************************************************************

You have received this e-mail bulletin as a result of your subscription to the Microsoft Product Security Notification   Service.
  For more information on this service, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/notify.asp.

To verify the digital signature on this bulletin, please download our PGP key at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/notify.asp.

For security-related information about Microsoft products, please  visit the Microsoft Security Advisor web site at http://www.microsoft.com/security.

 
 


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