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Category:   Application (Generic)  >   LPPlus Vendors:   Plus Technologies
Plus Technologies LPPlus Print Management System Lets Local Users Kill Any Processes and Print Any File
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1002221
SecurityTracker URL:  http://securitytracker.com/id/1002221
CVE Reference:   GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH   (Links to External Site)
Date:  Aug 20 2001
Impact:   Denial of service via local system, Disclosure of system information, Disclosure of user information
Vendor Confirmed:  Yes  Exploit Included:  Yes  

Description:   Several configuration vulnerabilities were reported in Plus Technologies' LPPlus print management system for Unix. Local users can start and stop printers, kill any processes, and print any printable files on the system.

It is reported that many of the programs installed by LPPlus are configured with set user id (suid) root privileges and with world-executable permissions. For example, the following binaries are installed mode 4755 by the installer:

$LPHOME/bin/dccsched
$LPHOME/bin/dcclpdser
$LPHOME/bin/dccbkst
$LPHOME/bin/dccshut
$LPHOME/bin/dcclpdshut
$LPHOME/bin/dccbkstshut

In the default configuration, these programs can be executed by any local user, giving any user on the system the ability to start and stop printing services.

Also, because the file $LPHOME/system/lpdprocess is created mode 777, any local user can send signal 2 (SIGINT) to any process on the system by replacing the PID in $LPHOME/system/lpdprocess with the PID of their target process and then running $LPHOME/bin/dcclpdshut.

Finally, the $LPHOME/bin/dccscan utility, which is configured with set user id (suid) root privileges and can be executed by any local user, can be used by any local user to potentially print any file on the system. This gives local users the ability to view the contents of any file on the system.

A demonstration exploit transcript is provided in the Source Message.

The vendor has reportedly been notified and confirmed the vulnerabilities.

Impact:   A local user can start and stop print services, kill any process on the system, and print any file on the system.
Solution:   No solution was available at the time of this entry.
Vendor URL:  www.plustechnologies.com/ (Links to External Site)
Cause:   Access control error, Configuration error
Underlying OS:  Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)

Message History:   None.


 Source Message Contents

Subject:  Multiple Security Holes in LPPlus


                        Multiple Security Holes in LPPlus
                        ---------------------------------
                                echo8, 8/23/2000

Summary
-------

LPPlus is Plus Technologies' print management system for unix. It
contains
several serious security holes, some of which undermine the integrity of
the printing subsystem, some of which threaten the security of the
system
on which the product is installed.

Details
-------

Hole #1: 

Of the 74 binaries that the installer put on my Solaris system, 26 were
installed suid to root and world-executable. On my linux box, it was 26
out of 64. Several of these should not be suid-root, or should be
group-executable only, and carefully restricted.

For example, the following binaries are installed mode 4755 by the
installer: 

$LPHOME/bin/dccsched
$LPHOME/bin/dcclpdser
$LPHOME/bin/dccbkst
$LPHOME/bin/dccshut
$LPHOME/bin/dcclpdshut
$LPHOME/bin/dccbkstshut

The first three start the scheduler, LPD server and network status
daemons, respectively. The next three stop the aforementioned services.
In
the default configuration, all six can be executed by any unprivileged
user, effectively giving any user on the system the ability to start and
stop printing services. No checking of userid, group or anything else is
done prior to execution. 

Hole #2:

$LPHOME/system/lpdprocess is created mode 777. 

This file contains the process ID of the dcclpdser process. The
combination of this file's permissions and the fact that dcclpdshut is
executable by any user allows an unprivileged user to send signal 2
(SIGINT) to any process on the system. All that's required is for an
unprivileged user to replace the PID in $LPHOME/system/lpdprocess with
the
PID of their target process and then run $LPHOME/bin/dcclpdshut.

Hole #3: 

$LPHOME/bin/dccscan is suid-root and can be executed by any user. It may
allow an unprivileged user to print files to which he does not have read
access. The ramifications are fairly obvious: although an unprivileged
user cannot read /etc/shadow (for example), using this utility, he may
be
able to print it out. In my testing, this worked even when sending to
printers to which my user was not given any access in the LPPlus
security
configuration (in fact, my test user had no access to ANY printers, or
ANY
LPPlus services). 

Some other potential holes:

* if the archive module is installed, $LPHOME/bin/dccasweep can be
executed by any user. This may undermine the integrity of the archiving
facility. 

* if the web interface is installed, it utilizes a very old beta version
of apache, and the installation requires that the server (and all of
its children, which run as nobody out-of-the-box) run as root. 

* on the linux system, $LPHOME was created mode 777. Root's umask was
set
to 022. This didn't seem to be the case on the Solaris system, although
the reason for this may be the different version of LPPLUS rather than
the
different unixes (see below for version info).  

Demonstrations
--------------

Hole #1: 

$ id
uid=600(test) gid=300(users)
$ ps -ef|grep dcc
    test 26357 26351  0 18:18:06 pts/0    0:00 grep dcc
    root 26262     1  0 17:41:50 ?        0:01 /opt/lpplus/bin/dccsched
    root 26272     1  0 17:42:03 ?        0:00 /opt/lpplus/bin/dcclpdser
    root 26276     1  0 17:42:14 ?        0:00 /opt/lpplus/bin/dccbkst
$ dccbkstshut
$ dcclpdshut
LPD048E Signal sent to dcclpdser to shut down.
$ dccshut
LPP054I LP Plus scheduler ordered to shutdown.
$ ps -ef|grep dcc 
    test 26253 26239  0 17:39:45 pts/0    0:00 grep dcc 
$

Hole #2

$ id
uid=600(test) gid=300(users)
$ ps -ef|grep inet
    test 26285 26279  0 17:42:42 pts/0    0:00 grep inet
    root 12276     1  0   Aug 22 ?        0:00 /usr/sbin/inetd -s
$ cat > $LPHOME/system/lpdprocess
12276
^D
$ dcclpdshut
LPD048E Signal sent to dcclpdser to shut down.
$ ps -ef|grep inet
    test 26291 26279  0 17:45:17 pts/0    0:00 grep inet
$ 

Hole #3:

# id
uid=0(root) gid=1(other)
# ls -alt /root/test
total 6
drwx------   2 root     other        512 Sep  5 17:46 .
-r--------   1 root     other        365 Sep  5 17:46 foo
drwx------   3 root     other        512 Sep  5 17:46 ..
# su - test
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.6       Generic August 1997
$ id
uid=600(test) gid=300(users)
$ ls -alt /root/test
/root/test: Permission denied
$ dccscan /root/test 30 5 "-dlp0"
$

# now, go to the printer and wait for the files to come out, or watch
them 
# being queued as root, if you have access to dccstat

Vulnerable Versions 
-------------------

3.3.0 for Unix (on Solaris 2.6). 
3.2.1 for Linux (on Redhat 5.2).
* These are the only versions I had available for testing.

Workarounds
-----------

At this time, no patches or updated versions are available. However,
most
of the utilities in question either don't need to be suid, or can be
group-owned by a more restricted group and mode 4750. The web interface
works fine with a newer version of apache, and the web server does not
need to run with all the children spawned as root. 

The vendor was notified of these problems on 8/24/2000. They did
respond,
confirming the existence of the holes. However, a request for an ETA on
an
updated release or patches has thus far been ignored.


 
 


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