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(NetBSD Issues Fix) Sendmail Buffer Overflow in Parsing Certain Header Comments May Let Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code with Root Privileges
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1006219 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1006219
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CVE Reference:
CAN-2002-1337
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Mar 4 2003
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Impact:
Execution of arbitrary code via local system, Execution of arbitrary code via network, Root access via local system, Root access via network
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes
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Version(s): 5.79 - 8.12.7
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Description:
A buffer overflow vulnerability was reported in the Sendmail mail transfer agent (MTA). A remote user could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the mail server (typically root privileges)
It is reported that the software contains an exploitable buffer overflow in the parsing of certain SMTP header elements. The report indicates that long sender or recipient header comments may trigger the flaw. A remote user could create a specially crafted message to cause arbitrary code to be executed on the target server. The target server could be the sending MTA, an intermediate MTA, or the destination MTA.
The vendor has labeled this bug as a "critical security problem."
The vendor credits Mark Dowd of ISS X-Force with reporting the flaw.
Another buffer overflow was reported in the processing of RFC 1413 ident protocol messages (this was discovered by a different user). According to the vendor, this is "non-exploitable."
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Impact:
A remote user could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target server, which is typically root privileges. Any MTA processing the message may be affected.
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Solution:
NetBSD has released a fix.
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2003-03-04 should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2003-03-04 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD):
src/gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 1.6:
Systems running NetBSD 1.6 sources dated from before 2003-03-04 should be upgraded from NetBSD 1.6 sources dated 2003-03-04 or later.
NetBSD 1.6.1 will include the fix.
The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-1-6 CVS branch:
src/gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-6 gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3:
Systems running NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, or 1.5.3 sources dated from before 2003-03-04 should be upgraded from NetBSD 1.5.* sources dated 2003-03-04 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-1-5 CVS branch:
src/gnu/dist/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-5 gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
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Vendor URL: www.sendmail.org/8.12.8.html (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Boundary error
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Underlying OS:
UNIX (NetBSD)
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Message History:
This archive entry is a follow-up to the message listed below.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Tue, 4 Mar 2003 01:36:07 -0500 (EST)
Subject: NetBSD Security Advisory 2003-002: Malformed header Sendmail Vulnerability
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
NetBSD Security Advisory 2003-002
=================================
Topic: Malformed header Sendmail Vulnerability
Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to March 4, 2003
NetBSD 1.6: affected
NetBSD-1.5.3: affected
NetBSD-1.5.2: affected
NetBSD-1.5.1: affected
NetBSD-1.5: affected
pkgsrc: mail/sendmail, mail/sendmail811, and
mail/sendmail88 are affected.
Severity: Possible remote root compromise
Fixed: NetBSD-current: March 4, 2003
NetBSD-1.6 branch: March 4, 2003 (1.6.1 includes the fix)
NetBSD-1.5 branch: March 4, 2003
pkgsrc: mail/sendmail version 8.12.8
and mail/sendmail811 version 8.11.6nb3
fix this issue. There is currently no
fix for mail/sendmail88.
Abstract
========
A malformed email message may allow remote attackers to gain the privledge
of the sendmail daemon process. This is usually root.
Technical Details
=================
Internet Security Systems (ISS) has discovered a remotely exploitable
vulnerability in the mail transfer agent (MTA) sendmail. The vulnerability
is message-oriented, which means that even sendmail daemons not directly
exposed to the internet can be compromised.
Further, no sendmail logs will indicate anything out of the ordinary in an
unpatched sendmail system.
Solutions and Workarounds
=========================
We advise sites running sendmail to upgrade as soon as possible. If upgrade
is impossible at this time, we recommend you turn off the sendmail service.
To determine if sendmail is running on your system, issue the command:
# /etc/rc.d/sendmail status
To stop currently running sendmail processes, issue the command:
# /etc/rc.d/sendmail stop
To ensure sendmail does not start after the next reboot, issue the command:
# echo "sendmail=NO" >>/etc/rc.conf.d/sendmail
To allow sendmail to start once upgraded, please remove the sendmail=NO line
from the end of /etc/rc.conf.d/sendmail.
The following instructions describe how to upgrade your sendmail
binaries by updating your source tree and rebuilding and
installing a new version of sendmail.
* NetBSD-current:
Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2003-03-04
should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2003-03-04 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD):
src/gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 1.6:
Systems running NetBSD 1.6 sources dated from before
2003-03-04 should be upgraded from NetBSD 1.6 sources dated
2003-03-04 or later.
NetBSD 1.6.1 will include the fix.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-1-6 CVS branch:
src/gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-6 gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
* NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, 1.5.3:
Systems running NetBSD 1.5, 1.5.1, 1.5.2, or 1.5.3 sources dated
from before 2003-03-04 should be upgraded from NetBSD 1.5.*
sources dated 2003-03-04 or later.
The following directories need to be updated from the
netbsd-1-5 CVS branch:
src/gnu/dist/sendmail
To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install sendmail:
# cd src
# cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-5 gnu/dist/sendmail/sendmail
# cd gnu/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no cleandir dependall
# cd sendmail
# make USETOOLS=no install
Thanks To
=========
Andrew Brown for preparing the fixes for the in-tree sendmail.
Stoned Elipot for preparing the fixes for pkgsrc.
Revision History
================
2003-03-03 Initial release
More Information
================
Advisories may be updated as new information becomes available.
The most recent version of this advisory (PGP signed) can be found at
ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2003-002.txt.asc
Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at
http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/.
Copyright 2003, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
$NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2003-002.txt,v 1.4 2003/03/04 03:34:36 groo Exp $
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