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Sendmail Buffer Overflow in Parsing Certain Header Comments May Let Remote Users Execute Arbitrary Code with Root Privileges
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1006199 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1006199
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CVE Reference:
CAN-2002-1337
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Mar 3 2003
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Impact:
Execution of arbitrary code via local system, Execution of arbitrary code via network, Root access via local system, Root access via network
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes
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Version(s): 5.79 - 8.12.7
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Description:
A buffer overflow vulnerability was reported in the Sendmail mail transfer agent (MTA). A remote user could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the mail server (typically root privileges)
It is reported that the software contains an exploitable buffer overflow in the parsing of certain SMTP header elements. The report indicates that long sender or recipient header comments may trigger the flaw. A remote user could create a specially crafted message to cause arbitrary code to be executed on the target server. The target server could be the sending MTA, an intermediate MTA, or the destination MTA.
The vendor has labeled this bug as a "critical security problem."
The vendor credits Mark Dowd of ISS X-Force with reporting the flaw.
Another buffer overflow was reported in the processing of RFC 1413 ident protocol messages (this was discovered by a different user). According to the vendor, this is "non-exploitable."
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Impact:
A remote user could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target server, which is typically root privileges. Any MTA processing the message may be affected.
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Solution:
The vendor has released a fixed version (8.12.8), available at:
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.8.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.8.tar.gz.sig
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.8.tar.Z
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/pub/sendmail/sendmail.8.12.8.tar.Z.sig
A patch is also available for version 8.12:
http://www.sendmail.org/patchcr.html
Various operating system distribution vendors will be issuing fix notices. See the Message History for those notices [Alerts will be posted as we receive them].
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Vendor URL: www.sendmail.org/8.12.8.html (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Boundary error
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Underlying OS:
Linux (Any), UNIX (Any)
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Message History:
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Mon, 3 Mar 2003 09:11:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-03:04.sendmail
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-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
=============================================================================
FreeBSD-SA-03:04.sendmail Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: sendmail header parsing buffer overflow
Category: contrib
Module: contrib_sendmail
Announced: 2003-03-03
Credits: Mark Dowd (ISS)
Affects: All releases prior to 4.8-RELEASE and 5.0-RELEASE-p4
FreeBSD 4-STABLE prior to the correction date
Corrected: 2003-03-03
FreeBSD only: NO
I. Background
FreeBSD includes sendmail(8), a general purpose internetwork mail
routing facility, as the default Mail Transfer Agent (MTA).
II. Problem Description
ISS has identified a buffer overflow that may occur during header
parsing in all versions of sendmail after version 5.79.
In addition, Sendmail, Inc. has identified and corrected a defect in
buffer handling within sendmail's RFC 1413 ident protocol support.
III. Impact
A remote attacker could create a specially crafted message that may
cause sendmail to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
user running sendmail, typically root. The malicious message might be
handled (and therefore the vulnerability triggered) by the initial
sendmail MTA, any relaying sendmail MTA, or by the delivering sendmail
process. Exploiting this defect is particularly difficult, but is
believed to be possible.
The defect in the ident routines is not believed to be exploitable.
IV. Workaround
There is no workaround, other than disabling sendmail.
V. Solution
Do one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 4-STABLE; or to the RELENG_5_0,
RELENG_4_7, or RELENG_4_6 security branch dated after the correction
date (5.0-RELEASE-p4, 4.7-RELEASE-p7, or 4.6.2-RELEASE-p10,
respectively).
[NOTE: At the time of this writing, the FreeBSD 4-STABLE branch is
labeled `4.8-RC1'.]
2) To patch your present system:
The following patch has been verified to apply to FreeBSD 5.0, 4.7,
and 4.6 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail.patch
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
# cd /usr/src/lib/libsm
# make obj && make depend && make
# cd /usr/src/lib/libsmutil
# make obj && make depend && make
# cd /usr/src/usr.sbin/sendmail
# make obj && make depend && make && make install
3) For i386 systems only, a patched sendmail binary is available.
Select the correct binary based on your FreeBSD version and whether or
not you want STARTTLS support. If you want STARTTLS support, you must
have the crypto distribution installed.
a) Download the relevant binary from the location below, and verify
the detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.6-i386-crypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.6-i386-crypto.bin.gz.asc
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.6-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.6-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz.asc
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.7-i386-crypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.7-i386-crypto.bin.gz.asc
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.7-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-4.7-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz.asc
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-5.0-i386-crypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-5.0-i386-crypto.bin.gz.asc
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-5.0-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz
ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/patches/SA-03:04/sendmail-5.0-i386-nocrypto.bin.gz.asc
b) Install the binary. Execute the following commands as root.
Note that these examples utilizes the FreeBSD 4.7 crypto binary.
Substitute BINARYGZ with the file name which you downloaded in
step (a).
# BINARYGZ=/path/to/sendmail-4.7-i386-crypto.bin.gz
# gunzip ${BINARYGZ}
# install -s -o root -g smmsp -m 2555 ${BINARYGZ%.gz} /usr/libexec/sendmail/sendmail
c) Restart sendmail. Execute the following command as root.
# /bin/sh /etc/rc.sendmail restart
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Path Revision
Branch
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
src/contrib/src/sendmail.h
src/contrib/sendmail/src/daemon.c
src/contrib/sendmail/src/headers.c
src/contrib/sendmail/src/main.c
src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
<URL: http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/398025 >
<URL: http://www.iss.net/issEn/delivery/xforce/alertdetail.jsp?oid=21950 >
<URL: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2002-1337 >
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-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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