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Re: OpenSSH Integer Overflow and Buffer Overflow May Allow Remote Users to Gain Root Access to the System
SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1005887|
SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1005887
(Links to External Site)
Updated: Jan 7 2003|
Original Entry Date: Jan 6 2003
Execution of arbitrary code via network, Root access via network|
Version(s): 3.5p1 and prior versions|
A vulnerability was reported in the OpenSSH implementation of the Secure Shell SSH protocol. A remote user can obtain root access on the system in certain configurations.|
In June 2002, a buffer overflow was reported in the processing of the number of responses received during PAM-based authentication. If the server is using using PAM modules that use interactive keyboard authentication (PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt), the system may be vulnerable.
As reported by Global InterSec (http://www.globalintersec.com/adv/openssh-2002062801.txt), affected versions of OpenSSH compiled with the '--with-pam' option contain an integer overflow in the input_userauth_info_response_pam() function. A heap-based buffer overflow can be triggered by the integer overflow of the unsigned integer 'nresp' variable as calculated using the return value of the packet_get_int() function (where this return value can be controlled by the remote user).
Version 3.4p1 and 3.5p1 were released to correct this flaw. However, it is reported that the flaw still exists and can be exploited. [Editor's note: Global InterSec has stated that this new report that the flaw still exists is a fake report.]
A demonstration exploit transcript is provided in the Source Message.
A remote user can obtain root level access on the system, under certain system configurations.|
No solution was available at the time of this entry.|
As a workaround, administrators can disable disable PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt in sshd_config. Users can also prevent privilege escalation by enabling UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd_config.
Vendor URL: www.openssh.org/ (Links to External Site)
Boundary error, Input validation error|
Linux (Any), UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)|
This archive entry is a follow-up to the message listed below.|
Source Message Contents
Date: Sat, 4 Jan 2003 19:37:03 -0800|
Subject: OPENSSH REMOTE ROOT COMPROMISE ALL VERSIONS
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*********** OPENSSH REMOTE ROOT COMPROMISE ALL VERSIONS ***********
MICKEY MOUSE HACKING SQUADRON ADVISORY #2
The nation's zeroth private security intelligence firm, Mickey Mouse
Hacking Squadron uniquely addresses the challenges faced by both public-
and private-sector organizations in protecting critical information
Our intelligence is timely, delivered 24 x 7, 365 (*) days per year;
relevant, fully customizable, and actionable intelligence is only
valuable if it makes a difference.
(*) in the case of a leap year, we of course provide a 24 x 7, 366 days
The following advisory is based on the excellent advisory published by
Global InterSec LLC *six months ago*:
After more than six months of intensive underground research, our ISO
31337 certified security department evidenced that the bug (an integer
overflow, resulting in a heap overflow) described in the aforementioned
advisory still exists in OpenSSH 3.5p1 and 3.4p1, and remains trivially
exploitable. All existing PAM enabled versions of OpenSSH (3.5p1, 3.4p1
and below) are therefore affected.
Due to various advisories posted to various fora by unnamed security
companies, this bug was supposed to be nonexistent or nonexploitable.
Fortunately, Global InterSec LLC shed some light on the whole affair and
revealed the malignant nature of the oversight to the world.
Their results were applied to the latest OpenSSH versions by privately
trained Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron security specialists and revealed
that the exploitation techniques developed by Global InterSec LLC are
still applicable to the newest OpenSSH.
PROOF OF CONCEPT
The following proof of concept is reproducing Global InterSec LLC
findings, enhanced with the patented research performed by Mickey Mouse
Hacking Squadron against OpenSSH 3.5p1.
First of all, the OpenSSH 3.5p1 server has to be built (with PAM support
$ tar xzf openssh-3.5p1.tar.gz
$ cd openssh-3.5p1
$ configure --with-pam
$ make sshd
Before the SSH server is actually executed, the sshd_config file should
be modified in order to enable PAM ("PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt yes").
In order to reveal the nature of the OpenSSH vulnerability, the next
step is to connect to the SSH server:
$ ssh werewolf.research.mmhs.com
Thanks to the "Password:" prompt, it is clear that PAM is actually
enabled (otherwise, the prompt would have been "user@host's password:").
This unique fingerprinting technique was investigated by Mickey Mouse
Hacking Squadron, and is already present in the latest version of the
Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron award winning network vulnerability
After the previous command was executed, the freshly spawned sshd
process has to be examined with a debugger, in order to set the correct
breakpoints within the input_userauth_info_response_pam() function of
OpenSSH, as demonstrated in the Global InterSec LLC advisory:
# gdb sshd 6552
(gdb) disassemble input_userauth_info_response_pam
0x80531bc <input_userauth_info_response_pam+192>: push %esi
call 0x807306c <xfree>
(gdb) break *0x80531bd
Breakpoint 1 at 0x80531bd: file auth2-pam.c, line 158.
Now that the buggy call to xfree() can be intercepted, the SSH client
should trigger the integer overlow and the resulting heap overflow:
$ ssh werewolf.research.mmhs.com
Password: <type a thousand 'A' characters here and hit enter>
After that, the xfree() breakpoint is reached, and the next call to
free() should therefore be intercepted in order to comply with the
technique developed by Global InterSec LLC:
Breakpoint 1, 0x080531bd in input_userauth_info_response_pam (type=61,
seqnr=7, ctxt=0x809c050) at auth2-pam.c:158
(gdb) disassemble xfree
0x807308e <xfree+34>: call 0x804ba14 <free>
(gdb) break *0x807308e
Breakpoint 2 at 0x807308e: file xmalloc.c, line 55.
Breakpoint 2, 0x0807308e in xfree (ptr=0x809dfb8) at xmalloc.c:55
(gdb) x /10x 0x809dfb8
0x809dfb8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x809dfc8: 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141 0x41414141
0x809dfd8: 0x41414141 0x41414141
>From here on, as demonstrated by Global InterSec LLC, exploitation
becomes trivial. For more information on exploiting calls to free() see
the excellent Phrack article "Once upon a free()" .
As mentioned in http://www.openssh.com/txt/preauth.adv, and as
demonstrated by noir in http://www.phrack.org/phrack/60/p60-0x06.txt,
"you can prevent privilege escalation if you enable
UsePrivilegeSeparation in sshd_config."
Mickey Mouse Hacking Squadron
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