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NetWare Enterprise Server Web Server for NetWare 5.x Discloses User Names, Group Names, and Other Information to Remote Users
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1002209 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1002209
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CVE Reference:
GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH
(Links to External Site)
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Date: Aug 17 2001
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Impact:
Disclosure of system information
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Exploit Included: Yes
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Version(s): NetWare Enterprise Web Server 5.1
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Description:
Nomad Mobile Research Centre reported a vulnerability in Novell's NetWare Enterprise Server that allows a remote user to obtain user names, group names, and other system information in a certain server configuration.
It is reported that the remote user can obtain this information when the server is configured to support NDS browsing via the web server.
The default location for this information is http://server/lcgi/ndsobj.nlm.
It is reported that the NDS browser is disabled by default.
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Impact:
A remote user can obtain information on NetWare user names, group names, and other information.
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Solution:
No solution was available at the time of this entry.
To disable the NDS browsing feature, the following steps provided by the author of the report can reportedly be performed via the WEBMGR utility:
" 1. Click File.
2. Click Select Server and select the appropriate server.
3. Select the \WEB directory on the drive that is mapped to the server and click OK.
4. Uncheck the Enable NDS browsing check box and click OK.
5. Click Save and Restart.
6. Enter the Web Server password and click OK."
The author notes that, as an alternative, an administrator can remove [Public] read access from the root of the NDS tree(s), which will keep all users (including internal non-authenticated users) from browsing the internal tree.
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Vendor URL: www.novell.com (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Access control error
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Underlying OS:
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Message History:
None.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2001 15:16:54 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: Groupwise Webaccess, NetWare web server, and Novell
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No idea if this is what the Groupwise Padlock
(http://www.novell.com/padlock) thing is about, since Novell is not only
vague in the issues, but never acknowledged Adept's findings.
- Simple Nomad - "No rest for the Wicca'd" -
- thegnome@nmrc.org - -
- thegnome@razor.bindview.com - www.nmrc.org razor.bindview.com -
-----
_______________________________________________________________________________
Nomad Mobile Research Centre
A D V I S O R Y
www.nmrc.org
Adept [adept@anonymoushosts.net]
Simple Nomad [thegnome@nmrc.org]
14Aug2001
_______________________________________________________________________________
Platform : Novell NetWare 5.x
Application : NetWare Enterprise Web Server 5.1
GroupWise WebAccess 5.5
Severity : Various
Synopsis
--------
The NetWare Enterprise Web Server 5.1 has a couple of security problems,
and these problems are related to additional products being used, such as
GroupWise WebAccess.
Tested configuration
--------------------
Testing was done with the following configuration :
Novell Netware 5.x, latest Service Pack
GroupWise WebAccess, latest versions
Issue #1 - Information Leak
---------------------------
When NDS browsing via the web server is enabled, if an attacker can
reach that server's port 80 they can enumerate information such as user
names, group names, and other system information.
The default location for gaining this information is
http://server/lcgi/ndsobj.nlm, which if NDS browsing is enabled will allow
the enumeration.
This is not especially a GroupWise problem, but WebAccess can "intensify"
the leakage, as it allows for more objects to browse. This is simply a new
flavor on an old problem (see http://www.nmrc.org/advise/nds1.txt and
http://razor.bindview.com/publish/advisories/adv_novellleak.html for
additional information).
Mitigation for Issue #1
-----------------------
The NDS browser is disabled by default, which is good. If enabled, you can
disable it by performing the following steps from the WEBMGR utility:
1. Click File.
2. Click Select Server and select the appropriate server.
3. Select the \WEB directory on the drive that is mapped to the server
and click OK.
4. Uncheck the Enable NDS browsing check box and click OK.
5. Click Save and Restart.
6. Enter the Web Server password and click OK.
Alternately you can remove [Public] read access from the root of the NDS
tree(s), which will keep everyone, including internal non-authenticated
users from browsing your internal tree.
Solution/Workaround for Issue #1
--------------------------------
Awaiting an official response from Novell, including acknowledgement of
the problem. They were notified a few months ago.
Issue #2 - Directory Listing
----------------------------
Poor handling of GET commands will allow for GroupWise WebAccess servers
to display indexes of the directories instead of HTML files. We have been
unable to get this to work consistently.
Basically, instead of issuing a "GET / HTTP/1.1" from NetCat against port
80 on the target system, using "get / http/1.1" causes a directory listing
to be displayed if indexing of directories is allowed, instead of a 501 or
502 error when indexing of directories is disallowed.
Mitigation for Issue #2
-----------------------
Unknown, possibly disabling indexing of directories on the web server.
Solution/Workaround for Issue #2
--------------------------------
Awaiting an official response from Novell, including acknowledgement of
the problem. They were notified a few months ago.
Comments
--------
Adept discovered these items, in certain cases it is possible to remotely
read email via port 80. This isn't exactly "point and click" to do, but
you get the idea. Adept came to NMRC for verification and assistance with
the advisory since his efforts (using Novell's reporting mechanisms, and
even using the bug itself to locate internal personnel within Novell that
might help) were futile.
Apparently no one is reading email at secure@novell.com, and since they
are not, we will probably be releasing additional advisories according to
the NMRC disclosure policy, which while not as verbous as RFPolicy is
fairly close to the same thing (http://www.nmrc.org/advise/policy.txt).
There are other problems that exist, and if Novell is going to drag their
feet and not use the notification method that NMRC helped get established
there, well, tough darts.
Greetz
------
It has been said that using Greetz in source code and advisories is lame
and childish. However, we being mature professionals disagree. So big
shout-outs to our brothas at eEye (you are right in full disclosure,
don't listen to the naysayers), our homies at Attrition (you are not just
a mirror of defacements, some of us know and appreciate that), RFP, Zope
Kitten, Lew NotTheAsshole, Blu Pi-thon, Neural Cowboy, cDc, rubberhose.org
(great idea), witness.org (give 'til it hurts), and everyone else we
forgot. And Adept sends a special shout-out to hektik.org.
_______________________________________________________________________________
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