(Vendor Issues Fix) The Bat! Windows E-mail Client Allows File Storage in Unauthorized Directories
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SecurityTracker Alert ID: 1000541 |
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SecurityTracker URL: http://securitytracker.com/id/1000541
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CVE Reference:
CVE-2001-0676
(Links to External Site)
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Updated: Mar 6 2004
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Original Entry Date: Jan 5 2001
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Impact:
Modification of system information, Modification of user information
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Fix Available: Yes Vendor Confirmed: Yes
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Version(s): up through 1.48f
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Description:
It has been advised that "The Bat!" (an e-mail client) contains a vulnerability that may allow any user of the e-mail client to save files in an unauthorized directory on the disk where file storage is provided.
SECURITY.NNOV released an advisory indicating that The Bat! performs unauthorized directory traversal.
Under normal operation, users can store attached files independently of the original e-mail message in a user-specific directory. This feature is disabled by default, but is reportedly used often. The Bat! does not ordinarily permit the filename to contain the '\' symbol. However, if the filename is specified as an RFC 2047 encoded word, the character checking is not performed. This allows the user to specify any directory on the disk.
The vendor (Rit Labs) was reportedly contacted on December 21, 2000.
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Impact:
A malicious user of the e-mail client can save files in any directory of the disk where file storage is performed. The user could save malicious batch files or executables. Apparently, it is usually only possible to write new files and not overwrite existing files. However, files can be overwritten if the "extract files to" feature is configured in the message filtering rules and the "overwrite file" function is selected.
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Solution:
The vendor has released a fixed version (1.49).
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Vendor URL: www.ritlabs.com/ (Links to External Site)
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Cause:
Input validation error
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Underlying OS:
Windows (Any)
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Message History:
This archive entry is a follow-up to the message listed below.
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Source Message Contents
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Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2001 23:06:36 +0800
Subject: Re: SECURITY.NNOV advisory - The Bat! directory traversal (public
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Hello 3APA3A,
I received this reply from Ritlabs:
> Dear Thomas,
>
>
> This is fixed in the version (which is unofficial one) you have and
> 1.49 is on its way - it will be released tonight :-)
>
>
> Thank you for your support!
>
>
>
> --
> Sincerely,
> Stefan mailto:bugs@thebat.net
Stefan Tanurkov is one of the two developers of The Bat!.
--
Cheers,
Thomas mailto:Thomas.F.ML@gmx.net
I'm using The Bat! 1.49 Beta/1 under Chinese Windows 98
4.10 Build 1998 with a Celeron 366Mhz, 128MB RAM
On Thu, 4 Jan 2001 21:55:46 +0300 GMT (05/01/2001, 02:55 +0800 GMT),
3APA3A wrote:
3> SECURITY.NNOV advisory - The Bat! directory traversal
3> Topic: The Bat! attachments directory traversal
3> Author: 3APA3A <3APA3A@security.nnov.ru>
3> Affected Software: The Bat! Version <= 1.48f (latest available)
3> Vendor: RitLabs
3> Risk: Average
3> Impact: It's possible to add any file in any directory
3> on the disk with file archive.
3> Type: Client software vulnerability
3> Remotely exploitable: Yes
3> Released: 21 December 2000
3> Vendor contacted: 21 December 2000
3> Public release: 04 January 2001
3> Vendor URL: http://www.ritlabs.com
3> Software URL: http://www.thebat.net
3> SECURITY.NNOV URL: http://www.security.nnov.ru (in Russian)
3> Credits: Ann Lilith <lilith-@rambler.ru> (wish her good
3> luck, she will need it :)
3> Background:
3> The Bat! is extremely convenient commercially available MUA for
3> Windows (will be best one then problem will be fixed, I believe) with
3> lot of features by Ritlabs. The Bat! has a feature to store attached
3> files independently from message in directory specified by user. This
3> feature is disabled by default, but commonly used.
3> Problem:
3> The Bat! doesn't allow filename of attached file to contain '\'
3> symbol, if name is specified as clear text. The problem is, that this
3> check isn't performed then filename specified as RFC's 2047
3> 'encoded-word'.
3> Impact:
3> It's possible to add any files in any directory on the disk where user
3> stores his attachments. For example, attacker can decide to put
3> backdoor executable in Windows startup folder. Usually it's impossible
3> to overwrite existing files, because The Bat! will add number to
3> filename if file already exists. The only case then files can be
3> overwritten is then "extract files to" is configured in message
3> filtering rules and "overwrite file" is selected.
3> Vendor:
3> Vendor (Rit Labs) was contacted on December, 21. Last reply was on
3> December, 22. Vendor claims the patch is ready, but this patch was not
3> provided for testing and version distributed through FTP site
3> ftp://ftp.ritlabs.com/pub/the_bat/the_bat.exe IS vulnerable. It looks
3> like all the staff is on their X-mas vocations or they don't want to
3> release new version because latest one was freshly released (file
3> dated December 20).
3> Exploitation:
3> By default The Bat! stores attachments in C:\Program Files\The
3> Bat!\MAIL\%USERNAME%\Attach folder.
3> (BTW: I don't think storing MAIL in Program Files instead of User's
3> profile or user's home directory is good idea).
3> In this configuration
3> Content-Type: image/gif
3> Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
3> Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="=?iso8859-1?B?Li5cLi5cLi5cLi5cLi5cV2luZG93c1xTdGFydCBNZW51XFByb2dyYW1zXFN0YXJ0dXBcMTIzLmV4ZQ==?="
3> will save attached file as
3> C:\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\123.exe
3> ( ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\123.exe )
3> There is no need to know exact level of directory, just add enough
3> "..\" in the beginning and you will be in the root of the disk.
3> Workaround:
3> Disable "File attachment stored separate from message" option. In case
3> this option is disabled there is still 'social engineering' problem,
3> because The Bat! suggests 'spoofed' directory to save file then you
3> choose to save it. Be careful.
3> Solution:
3> Not available yet. Wait for new version.
3> This advisory is being provided to you under RFPolicy v.2 documented
3> at http://www.wiretrip.net/rfp/policy.html.
3> --
3> /\_/\
3> { . . } |\
+--oQQo->>{ ^ }<-----+ \
3> | 3APA3A U 3APA3A } You know my name - look up my number (The Beatles)
3> +-------------o66o--+ /
3> |/
3> SECURITY.NNOV is http://www.security.nnov.ru - Russian security project
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