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Category:  Device (Embedded Server/Appliance)  >  SmartStor Vendors:  Promise Technology
Promise SmartStor NS4300N Lets Remote Authenticated Users Gain Administrative Access
SecurityTracker Alert ID:  1018754
SecurityTracker URL:  http://securitytracker.com/id?1018754
CVE Reference:  GENERIC-MAP-NOMATCH   (Links to External Site)
Date:  Sep 28 2007
Impact:  Modification of authentication information, Root access via network
Exploit Included:  Yes  
Version(s): NS4300N; firmware version 1.1.0.5
Description:  A vulnerability was reported in SmartStor NS4300N. A remote authenticated user can gain administrative access.

The 'usercp.php' script does not properly validate user-supplied parameters. A remote authenticated user can modify the password of the 'root' or 'admin' account. Then, the remote user can login with the new password to gain administrative access.

Tor Houghton reported this vulnerability.


Impact:  A remote authenticated user can modify the administrative account password to gain administrative access.
Solution:  No solution was available at the time of this entry.
Vendor URL:  www.promise.com/ (Links to External Site)
Cause:  Access control error
Reported By:  Tor Houghton <torh@bogus.net>
Message History:   None.


 Source Message Contents

Date:  Thu, 27 Sep 2007 23:19:27 +0200
From:  Tor Houghton <torh@bogus.net>
Subject:  Promise NAS NS4300N GUI bug

 
List,

There is a bug in the Promise NAS NS4300N web GUI (firmware version 1.1.0.5)
which allows an authenticated (admin) user to change the password of the
'root' account.

The user management portion of the web interface allows the admin user to
change user's passwords. The PHP script that handles this does not check to
see if the admin is changing a user account or system accounts such as
'root'.

By changing the value of the 'user' parameter to 'root' (from whatever user
id whose password is being changed, e.g. 'admin' if you have not defined any
users) in the POST request to /usercp.php, we can provide a known password
for the root account and thereby login to the NAS (which is normally not
possible because Promise has not divulged root's password).

The vendor has not been notified, but this is hardly a critical issue..?

Tor

moonshade:~$ telnet 192.168.5.16 2380
Trying 192.168.5.16...
Connected to 192.168.5.16.
Escape character is '^]'.
NS4300N R1.1 A10 (Version 01.01.0000.05) - Promise Technology, INC.
nas login: root
Password: 


BusyBox v1.00-rc2 (2006.11.07-01:55+0000) Built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

root is allowed to login.
[root@nas]# dmesg
Linux version 2.6.11SR1_1_2 (root@localhost.localdomain) (gcc version 3.4.1) #2 Tue Apr 3 15:43:13 CS
T 2007 On node 0 totalpages: 32768 DMA zone: 32768 pages, LIFO batch:8 Normal zone: 0 pages, LIFO batch:1 HighMem zone: 0 pages, LIFO batch:1 Built 1 zonelists Kernel command line: root=/dev/ram rw console=ttyS0,115200 IPIC (128 IRQ sources, 8 External IRQs) at fe000700 PID hash table entries: 1024 (order: 10, 16384 bytes) Console: colour dummy device 80x25 Dentry cache hash table entries: 32768 (order: 5, 131072 bytes) Inode-cache hash table entries: 16384 (order: 4, 65536 bytes) Memory: 123936k available (2276k kernel code, 660k data, 312k init, 0k highmem) Calibrating delay loop... 265.21 BogoMIPS (lpj=132608) -- http://www.bogus.net/~torh


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