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Synopsis:  Linux kernel i386 SMP page fault handler privilege escalation
Product:   Linux kernel
Version:   2.2 up to and including 2.2.27-rc1, 2.4 up to and including 
           2.4.29-rc1, 2.6 up to and including 2.6.10
Vendor:    http://www.kernel.org/
URL:       http://isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0022-pagefault.txt
CVE:       CAN-2005-0001
Author:    Paul Starzetz <ihaquer@isec.pl>
Date:      Jan 12, 2005


Issue:
======

Locally  exploitable flaw has been found in the Linux page fault handler
code  that  allows  users  to  gain  root  privileges  if   running   on
multiprocessor machine.


Details:
========

The  Linux  kernel is the core software component of a Linux environment
and is responsible  for  handling  of  machine  resources.  One  of  the
functions  of  an operating system kernel is handling of virtual memory.
On Linux virtual memory is provided on demand if an application accesses
virtual memory areas.

One  of  the core components of the Linux VM subsystem is the page fault
handler that is called if applications  try  to  access  virtual  memory
currently not physically mapped or not available in their address space.

The page fault handler has the function to properly identify the type of
the  requested  virtual memory access and take the appropriate action to
allow or deny application's VM request. Actions taken may also include a
stack expansion if the access goes just below application's actual stack
limit.

An exploitable race condition exists in the page fault  handler  if  two
concurrent  threads  sharing the same virtual memory space request stack
expansion at the same time. It is  only  exploitable  on  multiprocessor
machines (that also includes systems with hyperthreading).


Discussion:
===========

The   vulnerable   code   resides   for   the   i386   architecture   in
arch/i386/mm/fault.c in your kernel source code tree:

[186]  down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);

       vma = find_vma(mm, address);
       if (!vma)
              goto bad_area;
       if (vma->vm_start <= address)
              goto good_area;
       if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))
              goto bad_area;
       if (error_code & 4) {
              /*
               * accessing the stack below %esp is always a bug.
               * The "+ 32" is there due to some instructions (like
               * pusha) doing post-decrement on the stack and that
               * doesn't show up until later..
               */
[*]           if (address + 32 < regs->esp)
                     goto bad_area;
       }
       if (expand_stack(vma, address))
              goto bad_area;

where the line number has been given for the kernel 2.4.28 version.

Since the page fault handler is executed  with  the  mmap_sem  semaphore
held  for  reading  only,  two  concurrent threads may enter the section
after the line 186.

The checks following line 186 ensure that the VM request is valid and in
case  it  goes  just below the actual stack limit [*], that the stack is
expanded  accordingly.  On  Linux  the  notion  of  stack  includes  any
VM_GROWSDOWN  virtual memory area, that is, it need not to be the actual
process's stack.

The exploitable race condition scenario looks as follows:


A. thread_1 accesses a VM_GROWSDOWN area just below its actual  starting
address, lets call it fault_1,

B.  thread_2  accesses  the same area at address fault_2 where fault_2 +
PAGE_SIZE <= fault_1, that is:

[   NOPAGE    ] [fault_1      ] [     VMA     ]  --->  higher  addresses
[fault_2      ] [   NOPAGE    ] [     VMA     ]

where  one  [] bracket pair stands for a page frame in the application's
page table.

C. if thread_2 is slightly faster than thread_1 following happens:

[   PAGE2     ] [PAGE1                VMA     ]


that is, the stack is first expanded inside the expand_stack()  function
to  cover  fault_2,  however  it is right after 'expanded' to cover only
fault_1 since the necessary checks have already been  passed.  In  other
words,  the process's page table includes now two page references (PTEs)
but only one is covered by the virtual memory  area  descriptor  (namely
only page1). The race window is very small but it is exploitable.

Once  the  reference  to page2 is available in the page table, it can be
freely read or written by both threads. It will also not be released  to
the virtual memory management on process termination. Similar techniques
like in

http://www.isec.pl/vulnerabilities/isec-0014-mremap-unmap.txt

may be further used to inject these  lost  page  frames  into  a  setuid
application  in  order  to gain elevated privileges (due to kmod this is
also possible without any executable setuid binaries).


Impact:
=======

Unprivileged local users can gain  elevated  (root)  privileges  on  SMP
machines.


Credits:
========

Paul  Starzetz  <ihaquer@isec.pl>  has  identified the vulnerability and
performed further research. RedHat reported that a customer also pointed
out  some  problems  with the page fault handler on SMP about 20.12.2004
and they  already  included  a  patch  for  this  vulnerability  in  the
kernel-2.4.21-27.EL  release,  however  the  bug  did not make it to the
security division.

COPYING, DISTRIBUTION, AND MODIFICATION OF INFORMATION PRESENTED HERE IS
ALLOWED ONLY WITH EXPRESS PERMISSION OF ONE OF THE AUTHORS.


Disclaimer:
===========

This  document and all the information it contains are provided "as is",
for educational purposes only, without warranty  of  any  kind,  whether
express or implied.

The  authors reserve the right not to be responsible for the topicality,
correctness, completeness or quality of  the  information   provided  in
this  document.  Liability  claims regarding damage caused by the use of
any information provided, including any kind  of  information  which  is
incomplete or incorrect, will therefore be rejected.


Appendix:
=========

A proof of  concept code won't be disclosed now.  Special thanks goes to 
OSDL and Marcelo Tosatti for providing a SMP testbed.

- -- 
Paul Starzetz
iSEC Security Research
http://isec.pl/

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